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The aim of this paper is twofold. On the one hand to explain the institutional, economic 
and political foundations of the Portuguese bailout in April 2011. On the other hand, to 
clarify the impact of the global financial crisis (GFC) in Portuguese public finances, and 
the interaction between domestic fiscal policy and monitoring and recommendations 
from the European Commission (EC) and the European Council (ECo). A long run 
perspective (1974-2011) on management of public finances shows that Portugal has 
some institutional and constitutional problems that should be sorted out in order to 
achieve sound public finances. Moreover, in the second half of the 90s fiscal policy was 
expansionary and the high conversion rate of the former currency (escudo) to the euro 
still hampers economic growth and competitiveness. With weak growth in the first 
decade of XXI century and persistent public and external deficits, Portugal came to the 
frontline of the negative impacts of the GFC. The total absence of political cooperation 
and the existence of some minority governments only made things worst. We conclude, 
with a brief overview of the bailout, its prospects of success, and some structural 
institutional measures that should be taken.       
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In April 2011 Portugal became the third country in a row, after Greece and Ireland, to 
receive a bailout from the ‘Troika’ of the European Commission (EC), the European 
Central Bank (ECB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Financial markets 
began to become suspicious about the ability of the country to fulfill its sovereign debt 
liabilities, risk premiums increased up to a point where access to capital markets was no 
longer an option and a debt default soon became imminent. At this point the Portuguese 
minority Socialist government of José Sócrates had no option other than to negotiate a 
bailout in the form of a memorandum of understanding with the three lending consortia 
– the EC, ECB and IMF. 
The natural question is why did Portugal suffer this fate? This paper aims to 
explain the economic, political and institutional foundations that led to this bailout by 
exploring two key dimensions: the democratic institutions and fiscal policy of 
Portuguese governments shaped within the context of the European Union’s (EU) 
budgetary framework. Firstly, the paper examines the long-run trends in the 
management of Portugal’s public finances. Secondly, it explores the economic and 
fiscal situation before the crisis emerged. Thirdly, it analyzes the impacts of the global 
financial crisis (GFC) on the Portuguese economy and how the government first reacted 
to the crisis in line with the European Commission’s proposals. Thereafter, it explores 
how the government, in the emergence of the escalating sovereign debt crisis, weighed 
its policy priorities against competing claims (the need for economic stimulus, avoiding 
excessive deficits and stabilizing the financial markets), which measures were taken and 
why, when were they implemented and what was their impact. Finally, it will present 
the main measures included in the memorandum with the ‘Troika’ (EC, ECB and IMF) 
and concludes with the main shortcomings of the surveillance of public finance among 
EU member countries under the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) and the need for 
institutional reforms in Portugal. 
 
2. Democratic Politics and Public Finance in Portugal – an overview 
 
Throughout the entire democratic period following the 1974 revolution, Portugal never 
had a surplus in the state budget. The other country with such a bad record is Greece. 
Deficits were the rule without exception, and were considered normal in Portuguese 
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political discourse even before this last crisis. Recall too, that Portugal became the first 
country in 2000 to be subjected to the EU’s Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP), a 
process commenced by the European Commission under the Stability and Growth Pact 
(although one year later France and Germany were also placed under the EDP 
arrangements). 
Another peculiarity is the structure of fiscal federalism across the jurisdiction. 
The archipelagos of Madeira and the Azores have a special autonomous status, 
including the constitutional right to all tax revenues generated in their territories plus 
regional and local governments receive generous transfers from the State budget. This 
fiscal arrangement was embedded in the Constitution in 1976 and remains to this day 
despite several important amendments to other parts of the Constitution. Hence, 
Portugal is a unitary state but paradoxically has two ‘mini-states (autonomous regions) 
within its borders with more tax powers and tax revenues than real states within 
federations. Since it is formally a unitary state, the EUROSTAT does not provide any 
separate statistics for these regions. They are mixed up with fiscal statistics of local 
governments which contributes for a lack of transparency in public accountsi and 
judicial litigation.ii 
Since the restoration of democracy in 1976, the IMF has been involved in an 
enforced fiscal consolidation program in Portugal on three different occasions. The 
usual pattern of public finances was: firstly, a significant increase in public spending 
compared to GDP would occur leading to permanent deficits; secondly, higher deficits 
led to an increase of the debt to GDP ratio mainly in periods of low growth; thirdly, 
with the level of debt soaring, a privatization program was imposed on the government 
together with a restrictive fiscal policy (see Pereira 2012). The recent bailout of Portugal 
by the EC, IMF and ECB is, therefore, not a completely new story. Portugal was 
definitely not prepared for the GFC from the public finance point of view. However, as 
clarified below, the banking and financial sector was relatively robust and the housing 
bubble was not as important as in other countries. Figure 1 gives an overview of the 


























































































































































































































































Source: Pereira, P.T., Afonso, A. et al. 2012.
 
Figure 1 Portugal’s revenues, expenditures, deficits and debt – 1973-2010 
 
The reasons why Portugal was not prepared and could not respond adequately to the 
GFC were not only fiscal but also economic and political. A brief overview of economic 
and political constraints is necessary here. 
When the Maastricht Treaty, and the Stability and Growth Pact established the 
reference values for the ratio of debt to GDP (60 percent) and deficit to GDP (of 3 
percent), economists and politicians looked to the past growth record and considered it 
reasonable to assume a 5 percent annual nominal GDP growth rate in European 
countries. If economic growth was maintained at that level public finances would be 
sustainable. Portugal had a reasonable growth record in the 1990s but than an appalling 
one in the first decade of this century, particularly in the years immediately preceding 
the crisis. Low growth was associated with low productivity and a significant loss of 
competitiveness related to several factors. First, low educational levels, which have 
been widely acknowledged (see OECD 2010) do not promote productivity increases. 
Second, a higher than expected exchange rate established for the conversion of the 
former Portuguese currency (the escudo) to the euro brought further damage to external 
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competitiveness. Third, an allocation of European Structural Funds, spent mainly on 
infrastructure and other non-tradable goods and services, which contributed to increase 
productivity in the former years after joining the EU (in 1986), but became a partial 
waste of resources in the last decade. Finally, rigidities in the labor and housing markets 
were also considerably damaging to economic growth, contributing to low mobility in 
the labor market and, along with low interest rates, promoted a high household 
indebtedness. 
On the political front, Portugal faces some problems that are not common in 
European countries. The country has, like most European countries, a proportional 
representation system, which favors a fragmentation of parties in parliament when 
compared with majoritarian systems. However, two specific characteristics of 
Portuguese democracy are the lack of political competition associated with the 
closeness of the ballotiii and the difficulty in making coalitions, particularly the center-
left Socialist party which never formed a coalition with other left-wing parties. Only 
once did the Socialists achieve an absolute majority in parliament (2005-2009). All the 
other years they were in power, they formed minority governments or a weird and 
unstable coalition with the more extreme right-wing party, the conservative Popular 
Party (Partido Popular). This succession of minority governments were more prone to 
lobbying from interest groups and other special interests, pushing for increased 
expenditure and tax benefits, and less able to implement necessary reforms. 
 
3. The Situation in Portugal Before the Crisis Emerged 
 
From 2000 to 2007 the size of general government increased by 3.3 percent points to an 
aggregate of 44.4 percent of GDP, and all this increase was explained by growing social 
expenditures. Low growth and persistent deficits implied soaring public debt (as was 
shown in Figure 1) and higher debt serving charges. In just those seven years the ratio 
of debt to GDP increased from 48 percent to 68.3 percent of GDP. 
 
The Political Situation 
 
The political situation did not help governments in their fiscal management of the 
economy. As Chart 1 shows, the decade started  with a Socialist government with 
exactly half of the seats in parliament (115 out 230 members of parliament). This 
coincidence was not helpful, because on the one hand no-confidence motions could not 
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be carried to dismiss the cabinet, and on the other hand the government could not pass 
its proposed bills through the legislature. This eventually lead to the resignation of the 
Prime Minister Antonio Guterres in April 2002 and a right-wing coalition led by the 
center-right Prime Minister José Barroso took power. His government ended abruptly 
two years later in July 2004, when Barroso resigned to become the President of the 
European Commision. He was replaced, without elections by P. S. Lopes and supported 
by the same coalition of Social Democrats (center-right) and the Popular Party 
(conservatives). However, political unstability and erratic governance lead the President 
of the Republic to dissolve the parliament and call an early election which was won by 
the Socialists. A new government was formed led by socialist José Sócrates with an 
absolute majority in parliament. In short, in the period 2000-2007 Portugal had four 
different and usually unstable governments. This had important implications in the  
mismanagement of the economy and public finances. 
 
Fiscal Policy  
 
The first implication of the political instability – in particular the rotation from a center 
left-wing government to a right-wing government (2002) and vice-versa (2005), is that 
governments always like to present their inherited fiscal position in the worst light they 
can to provide a rationale for austerity measures. 
In 2002 Prime Minister José Barroso implemented a restrictive fiscal policy, 
freezing public employees’ wages and admissions, which had a pro-cyclical effect in 
2003 when the country entered into recession. His successor from the same party, on the 
other hand, developed a slight expansionary fiscal policy (see Figure 2). When the 
Box 1: Elections and Governments in Portugal 2000-2011 
1999-2002 XIV Government – Socialist (PM A. Guterres, a split parliament 115/230 seats) 
16 Dec 2001 Municipal and local elections  
17 Mar 2002 Parliamentary elections XV Government – Center-Right (PM José Barroso; Majority Coalition) 
  XVI Government – Center-Right (without elections) (PM P.S. Lopes due to resignation of José Barroso) 
22 Feb 2005 Parliamentary elections XVII Government – Socialist (PM J. Sócrates – Majority) 
9 Oct 2005 Municipal and local elections (for a 4 years term) 
22 Jan 2006 Presidential elections (for a 5 years term) 
7 Jul 2009 Parliamentary elections XVIII Government – Socialist (PM J. Sócrates – Minority) 
27 Sep 2009 Elections for the European Parliament (for a 4 years term) 
11 Oct 2009 Municipal and local elections (for a 4 years term) 
23 Jan 2011 Presidential elections (for a 5 years term) 
5 Jun 2011 Parliamentary elections XIX Government – Center-Right (PM P. P. Coelho – Majority Coalition) 
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Socialist Prime Minister José Sócrates reached power, in March 2005, he asked the 
Bank of Portugal to conduct an audit of the public deficit. The Central Bank predicted 
that, if no further measures were taken, net borrowing for that year alone would amount 
to 6.56 percent of GDP. This auditing of the deficit partly explained the sharp increase 
in net borrowing in 2005 which reached 5.9 percent of GDP (up by 2.5 percent). 
Sócrates retained the policy of freezing wages and new recruitment in the public sector 
started by the Barroso’s government in 2002. Just before the crisis (years 2005-2007) 
some fiscal consolidation was shown leading to an improvement in the structural 
primary balance and a reduction in net annual borrowing. The government also 
implemented an important reform to social security which significantly improved the 
long-run sustainability of the pension system. However, the short-run impact of this 
reform was very small. Additionally, there was a large scale reform program to central 
government (PRACE), changing the structure of all ministries. The aims were to make 
central government more efficient, to reduce expenditure and at the same time to 
increase its efficacy. However, since targets for expenditure cuts were not tightly 
quantified this particular objective was not achieved. 
Data from Figure 2 does not indicate what happened in the state-owned 
enterprises and public private partnerships (PPPs), outside the general government, 
which have obvious implications both on deficit and debt. From the beginning of the 
decade, governments became increasingly involved in PPPs. Initially most PPPs had an 
immediate positive impact on the budget balance, since when the government signed the 
contract it received a lump sum payment. Later on, such projects have a negative impact 
when the infrastructure has been built and government starts paying for its availability 
particularly if provided free of charge to users. That happened with many PPPs in the 
road transport sector. The excessive use of PPPs led to an over-capacity especially of 
highways and put a burden on the budget. Also in the health sector, several hospitals 
were transferred out of the general government sector to become public enterprises (off-
budget). The impact on the public accounts of this externalization of hospitals was that 
public expenditures decreased only slightly, because these hospitals were still funded 
mostly from current transfers from general government on a contract performance 
basis.iv However, the structure of public expenditure changed with such moves as, for 
example, hospital salaries no longer appeared as civil servants’ wages. Finally, with 
these institutions ‘off-budget’ the level of public debt appeared to decrease because their 
borrowings were not taken into account. One of the main problems of Portugal, on the 
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verge of the economic crisis, was that the creation of public enterprises at central, 
regional and local government levels was effectively a legal escape from the rigid 
deficit and debt targets from the Maastricht Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact 




















Source: AMECO database. 
 
 





The Portuguese economy enjoyed a period of high growth rates, decreasing 
unemployment and a rapid catch-up to the EU average in the late 1990s. This was a 
result of stage two of the European Economic and Monetary Union heading to the euro. 
In fact Portugal benefitted from decreased nominal and real interest rates, which lead to 
an increased private and public demand and also increased indebtedness in both sectors. 
Fiscal policy in the second half of the 90s was expansionaryv, while other European 
countries profited from low interests to consolidate their public finances.   Moreover, 
the Bank of Portugal and the European Monetary Institute (a predecessor of the 
European Central Bank) were overly optimistic about the ability of the Portuguese 
economy to withstand a high conversion rate of the former escudo.  
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The first seven years of the XXI century presented a quite different picture. 
Unemployment increased sharply from a low level of 4.5% in 2000 to 8.9% in 2007, 
and economic growth was anemic. There was a mild recession in 2003  (GDP 
contracted 0.9 percent) and growth rates were lower than 2 percent from 2004 until 
2006.vi 
As a result of this period of lower growth, there came a halt to the economic 
convergence to EMU standards. Between 1995 and 2000 the Portuguese per capita GDP 
was clearly getting closer to the EMU average (it rose from a low 47.6 percent of EMU 
average to 55.4 percent). However, in the following five years period (2000 to 2005) 
this convergence was much slower, rising only to 57 percent – a level at which it has 
largely remained ever since. Taking into account this low growth environment, the year 
2007 was a particularly good one, as GDP growth was 2.4 percent that year. Moreover, 
exports indicated signs of improvement, posting growth rates of 11.5 percent and 7.6 
percent in 2006 and 2007 respectively. Yet, even with an improvement in the trade 
balance, the country still presented a current account deficit of 10.1 percent of GDP in 
2007. 
 
4. The Global Financial Crisis – the European response and national politics  
 
Framework of Action at the European Level 
 
As the US subprime crisis burst in the summer of 2007, few predicted its effects would 
be felt so deeply and would spread as widely as they eventually did. In fact, financial 
markets faced important disturbances as early as August 2007, but it took several 
months before the cascading effects turned the subprime crisis into a global financial 
crisis of initially unthinkable proportions. 
The TED spread,vii a credit risk indicator widely used to measure stress levels in 
financial markets (see Figure 3), spiked significantly at the beginning of the subprime 
crisis in August 2007, and when Bear Sterns was rescued in March 2008. These events 
were clearly severe disturbances in financial markets. But the major increase in this 
indicator was related to the aftermaths of the Lehman Brothers breakdown in late 2008. 
The last event clearly marked the tipping point into a full GFC, triggering government 
financial sector rescues in the developed and developing world. Chart 2 indicates a 
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Figure 3 The financial markets stress – 2007-09 
 
It was only after these disruptive events that EU leaders, faced with the imminent 
collapse of several important financial institutions, decided to act decisively to foster 
financial stability in Europe. 
In October 2008, consecutive meetings of several EU and Euro Area governing 
institutions led to a set of decisions designed to increase confidence in the banking 
sector by raising the threshold of guaranteed deposits, and to provide guidance to deal 
with the problems of the financial institutions in a way which would lessen financial 
instability. Moreover, Euro Area governments started anticipating the likely impacts of 
the financial sector rescue packages in public accounts and so began to invoke the 
provisions for flexibility due to ‘exceptional circumstances’ in the SGP. 
At the end of 2008, it was increasingly acknowledged that financial market 
disturbances would wreak significantly damaging effects on economic growth and that 
the problems would not be solved simply by flooding the financial system with 
liquidity. It was then that it became clear to political leaders in Europe that both 
monetary and fiscal policy would have to be loosened promptly in order to avoid a deep 
and protracted recession. 
Therefore, in December 2008, the European Council approved the European 
Economic Recovery Plan (EERP), designed to push national governments to increase 
public expenditure in a coordinated move. A communication from the European 
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Commission at the time gravely stated that: ‘We sink or swim together’ (COM 2008:2). 
This quotation clearly captured the urgency that European institutions put in the 
implementation of a significant fiscal stimulus in order to support economic growth. 
The Euro-wide fiscal stimulus was first planned at €200 billion (or around 1.5 percent 
of GDP), and some months later, in March 2009, this amount was revised upwards to 
around € 400 billion (or 3 percent of GDP).viii 
 
Factors Contributing to the Initial Resilience of the Portuguese Economy 
 
After recording the best performance in seven years in 2007, the Portuguese economy 
continued to grow positively during most of 2008. Indeed, it was only in the last quarter 
of 2008 that GDP declined, but even then the major drag to growth came from exports, 
as internal demand remained bullish. Accordingly, it is important to identify the main 
sources of this initial resilience. One factor is the more risk-averse stance of the major 
Portuguese banks, leading to a more conservative investment profile overall. This meant 
that they had relatively low exposure to highly complex financial products that were 
affected in the original subprime crisis. Moreover, the spillover effects to the economy 
from the instability of world financial markets were at this stage less severe in Portugal 
than in other European countries. 
Moreover, the Portuguese real estate market had already faced major 
adjustments in the beginning of the decade and properties were considerably less 
overvalued than in other European countries. As a result, residential property prices, 
that had been growing at a slower pace after 2002, faced no more than a slight 






























Note: (1) new  and existing dw ellings.
 
Figure 4 Residential Property Price Index, Portugal vs Eurozone 1995-2010 
The resilience of the real estate sector was an important factor behind a better than 
expected performance of the Portuguese economy in 2008 for a number of reasons. 
First, negative spillover effects from this particular sector to other sectors, such as 
construction, were smaller than in other countries. Second, the banking sector did not 
have to deal with major downward revisions of the asset value of properties under 
mortgage contracts, as happened in other countries. Finally, confidence among 
Portuguese households was not shaken by a sudden loss of value of their major assets. 
In order to perceive how prospects for the Portuguese economy evolved during 
the first two years of the GFC, Figure 5 shows the consecutive revisions of both the 
IMF and the Bank of Portugal forecasts for the Portuguese economy from October 2007 
until the end of 2009. 
  2008 2009 2010 
IMF Oct 2007 2,0 2,2 2,2 
BoP Winter 2007 2,0 2.3 - 
IMF Apr 2008 1,3 1,4 2,2 
BoP Summer 2008 1,2 1,3 - 
IMF Oct 2008 0,6 0,1 1 
BoP Winter 2008 0.3 -0,8 0,3 
IMF Apr 2009 -0,5 -4,1 -0,5 
BoP Summer 2009 - -3,5 -0,6 
IMF Oct 2009 -0,5 -3 0,4 
BoP Winter 2009 - -2,7 0,7 
Source: IMF WEO database; Bank of Portugal BoP.  




In October 2007, two months after the subprime crisis manifested itself, the IMF 
forecasted that the Portuguese economy would growth at around 2 percent over the 
forecasting period (2008-10), and the revised outlook published in April 2008 presented 
only a slight downward revision of these projections. It was only on the last quarter of 
2008 (October) that the IMF acknowledged that the Portuguese economy could face a 
standstill in 2009 and it took until April 2009 for a significant economic recession to be 
reported in the forecasts.  By comparison, in October 2008 the IMF had already 
anticipated recessions in a number of advanced economies, namely in Iceland, Ireland, 
Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom. 
In a nutshell, the Portuguese economy was slower than other economies to show 
clear signs of economic deterioration as two of the most important sources of the global 
contagion in this initial period (disruptions in the banking system and collapses in real 
estate sector) were less pronounced. Consequently, the domestic recognition of the real 
impacts of the crisis in the Portuguese economy lagged significantly behind other 
vulnerable nations such as Spain or Ireland. 
 
Financial Sector Aid, Budgetary Reform and Discretionary Fiscal Stimulus 
 
The Portuguese government was swift in responding to EU requests and took decisive 
actions in an extraordinary meeting held in the 12th and 13th of October, only four days 
after the Ecofin meeting of October the 7th in which European leaders established a 
course of action to deal with financial turbulences. Decisions by the Portuguese 
government included an increase of government guarantees on bank deposits from 
€25.000 to €100.000ix and a €20 billion facility to be used in guarantees to Portuguese 
banks. 
In November 2008, in an environment of increasing surveillance of the banking 
sector’s performance, the government decided to nationalize BPN, a medium size bank 
that was facing significant liquidity constraints and in which the Bank of Portugal had 
found a number of irregularities. Simultaneously, the government opened a €4 billion 
facility to buy preferential shares of financial institutions, in order to ensure that they 
would achieve minimum capital requirements. 
Moreover, in the context of the European Economic Recovery Plan, the 
Portuguese government in December 2008 presented its own Investment and 
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Employment Initiative (IEI), which consisted of a plan to modernize secondary school 
buildings; boost economic activity and exports; raise social protection and employment 
and promote renewable energies and energy efficiency. The combined impact of these 
stimulatory measures on the public accounts was first estimated at €1.3 billion (or 
around 0.8 percent of GDP). 
As the European Commission had recommended, these measures were designed 
to boost economic growth temporarily in order to avoid a deeper and more protracted 
recession in the country. Although meant to be temporary, some of these measures were 
maintained into 2010 and an important part of the fiscal stimulus was effectively 
deferred into that year. 
In addition to discretionary fiscal stimulus prompted by the EU, there was an 
important fiscal impulse contained in the 2009 budget presented in parliament in 
October 2008. And this was where politics entered the scene. Anticipating elections by 
the end of 2009, the government agreed to a wage increase for civil servants of 2.9 
percent at a time it was already aware the economy was stagnating. It was the first pay 
rise for public employees after several years of a salary freeze. The government also 
reduced the standard VAT tax rate by 1 percentage point in July 2009. 
The combination of the EU-driven fiscal stimulus together with other 
discretionary policies, led to a significant increase in the public deficit. Apparently, the 
cyclical component of the budget balance in 2009, measuring the automatic stabilizing 
effect of the recession, only accounted for minus one percent of GDP, while the 
structural component accounted for -9.1 percent of GDP (see Figure 2 above). However, 
a more detailed analysis indicates that the state (mainly responsible for the general 
government deficit) had a revenue decline of 15 percent in 2009 and an expenditure rise 
of 6 percent suggesting that the cyclical (or non-discretionary) component of the budget 
balance should have been greater than one tenth. Nevertheless, a significant general 
government deficit of -10.1 percent, may have contributed to a less severe recession but 
it also escalated public debt in 2009. 
At the end of 2009 the Socialist party again won the elections, but only with 
minority support in parliament. Although there was a political majority of left-wing 
parties in parliament, the fact that the Socialists refused to form a coalition with these 
parties, because they were far too distant on the ideological spectrum, led to a minority 
government with the same Socialist prime minister. A further political failure at this 
time was the inability or unwillingness of the Portuguese President of the Republic to 
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insist on a coalition government with majority support in parliament. Although Portugal 
is a parliamentary system the President retains some relevant powers, including the 
ability to dissolve the parliament in extraordinary circumstances. However, the 
President himself was running for re-election in about one year (January 2011) and did 




Box 2: A Simplified Chronology of the Main Disruptive Events of the Global Financial Crisis Together with 




Jul 2007 (GFC): First clear signs of disruptions in the subprime market 
Feb 2008 (GFC): Rescue of Northern Rock (UK) 
Mar 2008 (GFC): Rescue of Bear Stearns (US) 
Sep 2008 (GFC): US government intervention in two major real estate agencies known as Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac (US) 
: Investment bank Lehman Brothers (US) collapsed 
: The take-over of AIG a worldwide insurance corporation (US) 
: Several important banks and financial institutions have to be rescued in the aftermath of 
the Lehman collapse: in the US (Wachovia and Washington Mutual); in 
Europe (Fortis, Dexia and ABN-AMRO in Benelux; Bradford & Bingley in the 
UK; Hypo Real Estate in Germany; Glitnir, Landsbanki and Kaupthing in 
Iceland). 
Oct 2008 (EU): ECB begins to loosen monetary policy in an unprecedented coordinated move with central 
banks from the US, UK, Sweden, Switzerland and Canada. 
: Consecutive meetings of the Heads of State or Government of the EMU; Ecofin and the 
Council of Europe agree to: raise guaranties on deposits to a minimum of 
€50.000; provide guidance to deal with financial institutions’ problems; and 
stress the flexibility of the GSP in exceptional circumstances. 
Oct 2008 (PT): Portuguese Government increases the guarantees on deposits from €25.000 to €100.000 
and set a €20 billion facility to be used in guarantees to banks. 
Nov 2008 (EU): EU approves financial assistance to Hungary. 
Nov 2008 (PT): Nationalization of BPN and provision of a €4 billion facility to buy preferential shares in 
order to reinforce the financial system’s capital ratios. 
Dec 2008 (EU): European Council approves the European Economic Recovery Plan (EERP) containing a fiscal 
stimulus of €200 billion (1.5% of GDP). 
Dec 2008 (PT): Portuguese Government announces a fiscal stimulus package, the Investment and 
Employment Initiative, amounting to 0.8% of GDP (around €1.3 billion). 
Jan 2009 (GFC): Nationalization of Anglo Irish (Ireland). 
Feb 2009 (EU): EU approves financial assistance to Latvia. 
Mar 2009 (EU): European Council re-evaluates the amount of the fiscal stimulus being pumped into the 
European economy to around € 400 billion (3% of GDP). 
: EU approves financial assistance to Romania. 
 
(1) Chart based mainly on information from the concise calendar of EU policy actions (page 57) of the report 





5. The Inevitability of the Bailout  
 
Fiscal Developments up to the Budget 2011 (introduced in October 2010) 
 
After the November 2009 elections, the Minister of Finance announced the need for a 
supplementary budget in order to allow for an increase net borrowing associated with an 
upward revision of the public deficit for 2009. 
The budget, usually approved in December was only promulgated in April 2010, 
because of the late elections. This implied that for the first four months of the financial 
year, the budget was implemented with the same appropriations as the 2009 budget. 
This delayed the possibility of fiscal consolidation. Furthermore, with a minority 
government in office various active lobbies were pressing for expenditure increases, and 
becoming more successful in gaining concessions and favorable legislation. For 
instance, school teachers, the largest group of civil servants, opposed their model of 
performance assessment as too bureaucratic. They not only managed to change that 
model but also amend the career-path of teachers in a way that will see the wage bill 
increase. The autonomous regions of Azores and Madeira lobbied for a more favorable 
Regional Finance Act and were able to pass the bill in parliament, even against the will 
of the government and under threat from the Minister of Finance to resign. Means test 
procedures intended to better target social benefits were relaxed, and the opposition was 
successful in limiting the type of allowances subject to means testing, therefore 
reducing the selective impact of the rationing measures. 
During the year 2010 the government presented successive measures trying to 
cope with the large deficit. In the middle of the year, the freeze on public sector salaries 
was continued and a new reduction in public managers’ salaries was imposed (reduced 
by 5 percent); the government increased all VAT rates by a further one percentage point 
and, in the personal income tax scales, created an additional top bracket applying to 
high-earners.  
 
Financial Markets Disturbances 
 
The risk premium that investors required to invest in 10-year maturity Portuguese 
treasury bonds (compared to German ones) had been falling steadily since the EMU 
formation and was stable at very low levels before the crisis emerged. This risk 
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premium, or ‘spread’, began to widen as the global financial crisis deepened. This was a 
clear flight to quality move by financial institutions, which was expected to be reversed 
once risk aversion returned to normal levels, and, indeed, from April 2009 to the 
beginning of 2010 there was a significant correction to the risk premium, as financial 
markets regained some confidence. However, during 2010 the spread to the German 
bund started to rise again and in the end of the year this premium was more than seven 
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Figure 6. Risk Premium for Portuguese, Irish and Spanish ten year bonds 
 
This widening of the risk premium on government debt markets was not exclusively 
Portuguese, as a similar movement happened in several other Eurozone countries and 
triggered the sovereign debt crisis that followed the GFC. Arguably, the main events 
triggering these severe increases in the Portuguese spread were related to Greece and 
Ireland bailouts, in May 2010 and November 2010 as Figure 6 indicates. 
 So, clearly, while the full impacts of the Eurozone debt crisis are yet to be 
revealed, its causes go well beyond the Portuguese situation. Here, however, the focus is 
solely on the impacts of this sovereign debt crisis to the Portuguese economy and in the 
fiscal response it ultimately triggered. One important point to bear in mind is that 
contrary to Portugal’s relative resilience to the first shocks coming from the GFC, the 
sovereign debt crisis had an overwhelming effect in the Portuguese economy. 
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 At the commencement of 2010, the Portuguese economy was starting to recover 
from the previous difficult year, with exports recovering at a faster pace than expected 
and public spending supporting investment and household incomes. Yet, high public 
and external debts and low growth prospects soon placed the country on the radar of the 
financial markets which pressured a steep deleveraging process. Soon Portuguese debt 
was spiraling out of control. The downward spiral was triggered by high risk premiums 
being charged for borrowings, which in turn significantly increased the costs to service 
public debt, that then amplified the doubts on the country’s ability to keep up with its 
repayments (risk of default), which further increased the risk premium. It was a vicious 
circle amplified by constant downward reviews of the country’s sovereign rating as 
Figure 7 indicates. 
 
  Fitch Moody’s Standard & Poor's 
2010 
24-Mar AA- - - 
27-Apr - - A- 
5-May - Aa2 - 
13-Jul - A1 - 
30-Nov - - A- 
23-Dec A+ - - 
2011 
15-Mar - A3 - 
24-Mar AA- - BBB 
29-Mar - - BBB- 
1-Apr BBB- - - 
5-Apr - Baa1 - 
5-Jul - Ba2 - 
Source: Bloomberg   
 
Figure 7 Calendar of sovereign debt negative reviews 
 
Moreover, the erosion of market confidence was not confined to sovereign debt markets 
but affected the ability of Portuguese banks to secure finance in the marketplace, which 
immediately led to a shut-down in capital markets to Portuguese banks, making them 
ever more dependent of ECB funding as they were unable to restore their credibility in 
order to return with normal interbank market activity. 
 These financial developments triggered a complete somersault in Portugal’s 
fiscal policy stance, as the government was pressed to remove the fiscal stimulus swiftly 
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and present a credible path of fiscal consolidation. The main events of this turmoil with 




From the 2011 Budget to the Resignation of the Prime Minister 
The 2011 budget, presented in October 2010, was the first budget with a clear fiscal 
consolidation objective. The new target for the 2011 deficit was reduced down from 7.3 




Dec 2009: EU council opened excessive deficit procedures on a list of 8 countries, including Portugal. 
Mar 2010 Approval of the 2010 budget. 
May 2010 € 110 billion bailout to Greece and the establishment of the European Financial Stabilization 
Mechanism (EFSM); and the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF). 
May 2010 Deficit target for 2010 revised upwards to 7.3%. 
 A wide set of consolidation measures were announced. 
Nov 2010 € 85 billion bailout to Ireland. 
Nov 2010 Approval of the 2011 budget, including further consolidation measures were included in the 
2011 budget. 
Mar 2011 Additional consolidation measures presented in the informal meeting of Heads of State or 
Government of the EMU. These were then rejected in the Portuguese parliament 
and the Sócrates government resigned. 
 2010 deficit was revised upwards from 7.3% to 8.6% due to the inclusion of three State 
Owned Enterprises in the consolidation perimeter. 
Apr 2011: Portugal requests a bailout – through the negotiation of an Economic Adjustment Program 
with the IMF/EC/ECB within the framework of the European Financial Stabilization 
Mechanism (EFSM). 
2010 deficit was revised upwards from 8.6% to 9.1% due to the reclassification of several PPP 
contracts. 
May 2011: The Portuguese government and the ‘Troika’ sign the Memorandum of Understanding that 
includes a financial package of €78 billion. 
 
(2) Based mainly on information from the European Commission’s report ‘The Economic Adjustment Program of 





percent of GDP to 4.6 percent (a fall of 2.7 percent on previous projections). The main 
consolidation measures included on the expenditure side were a progressive wage cut 
for civil servants with salaries above €1500 (their first ever salary cut in 37 years of 
democracy), and a reduction in social protection expenditures. In the revenue side, a 
reduction in tax benefits and an increase on the VAT normal rate from 21 to 23 percent 
were proposed. 
 Since the Socialists were in a minority government there were long budget 
negotiations with the major opposition party which eventually led to a formal 
agreement. It included the need to create an independent committee to analyze public-
private partnerships, a commitment to reduce public expenditure and a lower reduction 
of tax benefits than that requested by the government. 
 March was the decisive month. On March 2nd the Prime Minister and the 
Minister of Finance went to Berlin for a private meeting with the German Chancellor 
Angela Merkel. The objective was to calm down capital markets and perhaps to talk 
about the austerity measures to include in the Stability and Growth Program (SGP) in 
exchange of a broad support from the European Stability Mechanism (ESM). The Prime 
Minister and the Minister of Finance decided to anticipate some strong austerity 
measures, which should be included later on in the Portuguese SGP. The objectives 
were twofold. On the one hand, the government sought to send signals to the markets 
that the country intended to succeed in fiscal consolidation and, on the other hand, to 
gain some bargaining influence at important EU meetings ahead. 
 On March 11th the government called a press conference and announced a large 
set of austerity measures. On the same day, without even consulting the President, the 
Prime Minister presented these measures at the Euro group meeting in Brussels. On the 
following day the leader of the main opposition party announced he would not support 
the so called ‘SGP-IV’. On March 15th Moody’s downgraded the sovereign debt rating 
of Portugal from A1 to A3. The government formally submitted the SGP to parliament 
on the 21st where it was opposed by all other non-government parties from the left and 
right. These parties moved a series of amendment motions against the SGP which were 
all approved with the combined votes of the opposition parties on the 23rd March, 





6. The New Fiscal Framework and the Memorandum (bailout) 
 
Following the resignation of the Prime Minister, the President declared general 
elections for June 5th 2011. But two months was too much time for Portugal to languish 
with a caretaker government. There was a need to borrow in capital markets, and 
Portuguese bond yields were rising against German bonds. On 8th April the Eurogroup 
and ECOFIN ministers issued a statement, extending financial support to Portugal under 
a conditionality agreement (Memorandum of Understanding on Specific Economic 
Policy Conditionality – MoU). A €78 billion loan was agreed with an equal tripartite 
division between the IMF, the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) and the 
ESM. Although main negotiations were between the Portuguese minority government 
and the ‘Troika’ of the IMF, EC and ECB, the main opposition right-wing parties gave 
their formal agreement to the MoU. Notably, before the Prime Minister stepped down 
the rightist parties were against any further austerity measures (e.g. tax increases), but 
once he resigned, and even before general elections, they accepted everything they had 
opposed and even accepted further austerity measures. Such is politics! 
 
The Introduction of a New Fiscal Framework 
 
The lack of political cooperation was clear in that interim period (April-May) when a 
new and important change to the Budget Framework Law (LEO) was approved on April 
6th with only the votes from the minority Socialist party. Nevertheless, it introduced an 
array of important changes. It established a relatively independent Council of Fiscal 
Policy (CFP), whose main functions were to develop its own macro-economic forecasts, 
to analyze the sustainability of public finances (including pensions), to verify whether 
the fiscal rules set by law were being violated or not, and to check whether the limits to 
indebtedness of regional and local governments were being surpassed or not. The LEO 
set fiscal rules not only for general government (including the structural balance) but 
also for central government and social security. With regional and local governments, 
since they have autonomy from the state budget limits, the LEO imposed limits only on 
indebtedness. It also stipulated that multi-year limits would apply to central government 
expenditure funded by general revenues with cascading limits to expenditure programs 
and groups of programs. The more ambitious task proposed by the LEO is the 
progressive implementation of zero-based budgeting not only across public 
administration, but also in public enterprises. Priority should be given, says the law, to 
23 
 
those programs which have deficits. The target of an almost balanced budget (adjusted 
for the cycle) should be achievable by 2015, and the annual SGP should update the 
consolidation path to reach that objective. The LEO also lays out the general 
chronology of the budget process, starting precisely with the presentation of the multi-
annual SGP. 
 
Memorandum, Consolidation Path and Main Measures to Reduce the Deficit 
 
The bailout of May 2011 (MoU) has to date been mostly implemented by the new 
government with majority support in parliament that emerged from the legislative 
elections of June 5th. As an overarching consolidation document, it has a detailed, 
quantified and time-specified set of measures to be taken by the Portuguese 
government. Objectives are set by quarter, and after each quarter there is an assessment 
of the progress done. The measures included in the initial memorandum were very 
broad, including: (i) fiscal policy and fiscal structural measures; (ii) financial sector 
regulation and supervision; (iii) labor market and education; (iv) markets of goods and 
services (energy, telecommunications, transport); (v) the housing market; and (vi) the 
judicial system. Focusing on the first type of measures the MoU set a consolidation path 
until 2013 where the deficit should be no more than 5.9 percent of GDP in 2011, 4.5 
percent in 2012, and 3 percent in 2013. The main measures directed to fiscal 
consolidation were the following:  
i) Privatizations of public sector enterprises: energy producers, flight companies, 
the post office, etc. 
ii) Targeted expenditure rationing: (e.g. a decrease in pensions above 1500 euros 
plus savings on health expenditures). In 2012 and 2013 a freeze has been 
imposed on recruitment, promotions and wages for the public sector. 
Transfers to local and regional governments have been reduced and controls 
over the expenditures of state-owned enterprises tightened. Capital 
expenditures have been trimmed and are to be funded mainly by own 
revenue sources or from increase European funding. 
iii) Targeted revenue measures include: a revision of the list of goods and services 
subject to reduced VAT rates, increase revenues from personal income tax 
(increased marginal tax rates and reduced tax benefits)and corporate income 




 The idea behind the Memorandum was also to introduce measures that would 
increase competitiveness in the long-run. Among these more structural measures, 
mainly targeted at reducing rigidities in housing and labor markets, is a significant 
decrease in the employers’ contribution to social security. 
 Although the austerity program was designed to curb some of the most 
important structural problems over the long-run (to improve internal efficiencies and 
liberalize sectors), there were some one-off measures (e.g. privatizations) that will have 
a short-run impact on reducing debt, but on the other hand reducing the assets of the 
public sector that in some cases generated dividends (a public revenue). Other measures 
that the government adopted in 2011 to help achieve the deficit target of 5.9 percent of 
GDP had an immediate impact on the deficit, such as the incorporation of pension funds 
in the banking sector into social security accounts, but created an implicit debt. In fact 
this incorporation of these pension funds was an important one-off revenue boost in 




Portugal’s problems with its public finances are closely connected with the level of 
external debt and the lack of competitiveness of the economy. In some part, the present 
difficulties arose from Portugal’s past structural mismanagement of public finances, in 
particular in phases two and three of the EMU. The tolerance of a poor commitment to 
fiscal discipline and an overvalued currency (the euro) created major challenges both to 
the Portuguese economy and to fiscal policy. 
The analysis of this paper has emphasized the shortcomings of the proximate 
institutional framework (at the international, European and domestic levels) that served 
to impinge on the nature, design and speed of fiscal policy as a response to the GFC. 
Insofar as European institutions are concerned, the Portuguese case is illustrative of how 
monitoring from the European Commission and European Council appears to have been 
flawed. They were slow in anticipating the scope of the GFC and its impact on Portugal, 
perhaps partly due initially to the smaller impact of the crisis on the banking system and 
the real state sector compared to other countries. The initial targets of the early version 
of the SGP were limited because they essentially focused on the public deficit and 
largely neglected the public debt. These institutions failed to take account of the debt of 
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public corporations which, at some stage may be outside general government (‘off-
budget’), but in a further moment can be included and therefore deteriorate the public 
finances of particular countries.x Moreover, the Ministry of Finance, and the National 
Audit Court did not gave due relevance to public corporations’ debt.   
These monitoring and informational failures are not an excuse for not 
acknowledging the Portuguese government’s mismanagement of public finances. 
Political instability and inherent weaknesses of the domestic political system helped 
paralyze responses and reforms. Portugal poor record in its economic and fiscal policy 
settings was related to the specific characteristics of the political system, in particular 
lack of political competition, difficulty of making coalitions (and majority governments) 
and absence of independent institutions to scrutinize fiscal policy. Moreover, a constant 
turnover of governments, many in minority status, did not help the nation’s plight. So, 
before the crisis hit, instead of benefitting from decreasing interest rates in order to have 
increasing primary surpluses and decreased levels of public debt, governments used 
these savings to deteriorate their primary balances. They formally abided with the 
Maastricht budget deficit criteria by counting windfall or extraordinary revenues (e.g. 
third generation mobile licenses) rather than taking structural consolidation measures. 
Political failure and policy timidity exacerbated the eventual impact of the GFC and 
sovereign debt crisis. 
The implementation of the “troika” program has had some achievements in what 
concerns the fiscal framework and Portugal has benefited from successive positive 
evaluations from the EC/ECB/IMF.xi Public deficit in 2011 should have decreased to 
4,2% of GDP below the target in the MoU, although with one-off extraordinary 
revenues. The independent Council for Public Finances is now set up, although still 
lacking human resources. Some major privatizations were done with success. A 
program for restructuring of public corporations in the transport sector (responsible for 
the major part of the public corporations’ debt) is starting to be implemented. All public 
finance data, is monthly delivered by the Ministry of Finance and available online in 
Portuguese and in English. In the 2012 budget, and for the first time, are included all 
public corporations which are considered within public administrations (because they 
are non market corporations). In one year the change in the fiscal framework has been 
impressive. The government also took some ambitious and controversial measures in 
the budget for 2012 announcing severe cuts in bonuses for both civil servants and 
pensioners, to which the main opposition party has abstained.xii  
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However, there are still some threats. The ratio of debt to GDP at the end of 
2011 is high (107,8%xiii) and still increasing, and so is the unemployment rate (15,5%). 
The recession in 2012 is predicted to be  higher (around 3,2%) than expected by the 
government in the Budget (2,8%) and the deficit target (4,5%) seems not to be achieved 
without some sort of one off measures given the fall in tax revenues, particularly from 
the Value Added Tax.xiv Achieving the deficit target for 2013 (3% of GDP) would 
require a deep fiscal consolidation policy with increasing taxes and further expenditure 
cuts which would have more negative effects on growth, unemployment and social 
cohesion. An alternative and more realistic strategy would be to shift one year the 
consolidation path. In any case, the real future challenge is to achieve sustainable 
economic growth.xv           
What lies ahead is uncertain. Currently, the viability of the euro project is under 
scrutiny. It is not just Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Cyprus but also Spain and Italy 
which are under the pressure of the markets. The solution to the euro crisis has to be 
global, and the ECB, directly or indirectly, has to give guarantees that it will not allow 
that bond yields will surpass some target value, particularly for all the countries which 
are abiding with a reform of their institutions and following a consolidation path. The 
future of Portugal is integrally connected with the future of the EU and the solutions to 
be found in the euro area. These are not only financial but also and mainly connected 
with economic growth. Here, there are some ongoing worrying concerns which are 
related mainly to the inability of nations such as Portugal to undertake a fiscal 
devaluation within the Eurozone. At present such a policy does not appear a viable 
option and this could retard the nation’s ability to increase its competitiveness and build 
economic growth after enduring the present period of fiscal austerity and recession. 
And, yet, there are some positive news. In Portugal, the government has an absolute 
majority in Parliament and enjoyed a larger consensus around the necessity to 
implement carefully the consolidation program. The parties that signed the agreement 
consist of about 80 percent of the members of parliament, although the actual majority 
supporting the government is smaller. This shows that there has been a wide political 
support for the fiscal consolidation program. However, there is neither a long run 
binding agreement between the three major parties on a consolidation path, nor much 
dialogue between them on the implementation of the consolidation program and the 
institutional and constitutional reforms needed to address the problems identified in this 
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paper. Such dialogue, cooperation and compromises seem critical to give sustainability 
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i In the European System of Accounts (ESA), General Government (S13) is divided in Central 
Government (S1311), State Government (S1312), Local Governments (S1313) and Social Security 
(S1314). It is paradoxical that the Regional and Local governments are mixed up in S1313, when the 
Autonomous Regions have more tax powers and revenues than many States in federations (e.g. the 
German Lander) classified under S1312. 
ii Litigation on this issue (Municipality of Funchal/Madeira vs. Ministry of Finance and Public 
Administration) reached the Supreme Administrative Court. The source of the litigation is a weird norm 
in the Constitution which is against the theory of fiscal federalism that states that certain regions (Azores 
and Madeira) have the right to all fiscal revenues generated in the territory. Moreover, municipalities have 
a share up to 5% of personal income tax yields generated in the territory. The dispute is where do these 
5% come from: the regional government’s budget or central government’s budget? The decision (see 
Supremo Tribunal Administrativo (2012) based on a previous decision of Tribunal Constitucional (2008)) 
was in favour of the Ministry of Finance.      
iii To understand why the Portuguese ballot structure is closed and gives very few freedom for voters to 
choose candidates see Pereira, P. and Silva, J. A. (2009).  
iv See Eurostat (2010) to understand when hospitals may be considered public corporations outside 
general government and also the meaning of several financial operations between hospitals and general 
government. 
v The primary balance adjusted for the cycle decreased 2,7 percentage points between 1995 and 2000 
which exactly offsets the benefits of decreasing interests. 
vi A good analysis of this shift “from boom to slump” can be found in Blanchard (2007). The discussion 
on the dilemmas of the Portuguese economy and the policy options available, are still of current interest.   
vii The TED Spread measures the difference between what the market asks for lending to the banking 
sector and to the government for 3 months loans. 
viii The practical impact of the fiscal stimulus was apparently small (see Afonso, A et al. (2010) and ECB 
2010). 
ix EU leaders had set the minimum guaranteed threshold in €50.000. 
x This happened in 2011 when the Eurostat and the INE (European and Portuguese statistical authorities, 
respectively) have reclassified several public corporations and included them in general government. 
xi There are quarterly evaluations and up to the 4th assessment, the overall appreciation was positive. We 
can anticipate that the 5th assessment (August 2012) will be much more cautious given the likelyhood that 
the deficit target cannot be achieved without some sort of extraordinary measures given the evolution of 
tax revenues, well below what was predicted in the State Budget.   
xii These cuts go beyond the agreement with the ‘Troika’, and  a group of Members of Parliament has 
approved to send the 2012 Budget to the Constitutional Court  (CC) in order to appreciate whether these 
measures violate the Constitution and the Court has decided that it violates the Constitution (see Tribunal 
Constitucional 2012). However, the Budget will be enacted until there is a decision, which will not 
happen within the next four or five months.   
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xiii This value compares with 162% (Greece), 120% (Italy), 97,2% (Belgium) and 85,4% (France), data 
taken from AMECO in January 2012. The value for Portugal is more accurate than the one presented in 
AMECO, because it considers more updated information on public debt (European Commission 2012). 
The European Commission forecasts a maximum of this ratio of 118,6% of GDP in 2013 assuming no 
slippery on deficit targets. 
xiv One of the authors has a monthly prediction of the annual deficit in national accounts for a national 
newspaper (Público). The July 2012 prediction is 5% of GDP without additional one off or other 
extraordinary measures. This target is achieved mainly with the two measures referred to earlier (the cuts 
of Summer and Christmas’ bonuses of civil servants and pensioners) that cannot be replicated in the 2013 
Budget.   
xv The OECD (2012) predicts recessions in 2012 and 2013 of 3,2% and 0,9 respectively. 
